OWASP ‘Top 10 Mobile Risks’ – Part 1

OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) has come up with a top 10 risks for the mobile technology. This list is in the ‘beta’ stage. The list, released on 23rd September 2011, has been under a 60 day review period and is due for a final version release any time. When released, this will be the first official version of OWASP top 10 for mobile applications.  The current list of OWASP Top 10 Mobile Risks (Release candidate) is reproduced below: Continue reading “OWASP ‘Top 10 Mobile Risks’ – Part 1”

Typosquatting-Use of Doppelganger Domains to steal data

We often mistype domain names when we are searching the web or trying to access a website. For e.g. we type instead of gmail.com, we may type gamil.com or icicibank can be typed as icici bank. Researchers have now shown that by creating ‘doppelganger’ (German origin-meaning duplicate or double) domains it is possible to steal information. A extract of the article has been included here.
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Some “Dumb” Hacks

Hackers are known to be very clever and smart — which they need to be to remain one step ahead of the IT Security Professionals and the law administrators. However, here are some interesting “dumb moves” by Hackers that helped the officials track them down. Extracted from an article by Alan Wlasuk, and from a recent “PC World” article.

 

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The more they happen, the more they remain the same.

UBS reported a rogue trader attack and informed losses to the extent of over USD 2.3 Billion.

 

Links to the story can be found at

https://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d5547ba0-e05b-11e0-ba12-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1ZhGoMU1H
https://www.ubs.com/1/e/media_overview/media_global/releases.html?newsId=195150

As is customary nowadays, any incident is reported as effect of rogue trade. Banks in a momentary lapse of concentration fail to dwell on how a back office trader can run losses of over USD 2 billion, which in effect means unauthorised trades of many more billions.

Coming closely on the heels of the Socgen rogue trade, there is not much information yet on the modus operandi for the UBS scandal, but initial reports suggest a very similar methodology between Socgen and UBS such as dealing in complex financial instruments, exceeding authorisations and so on.

The initial disclosure by UBS indicates that the “positions had been offset in our systems with fictitious, forward-settling, cash ETF positions, allegedly executed by the trader”, which means that there was an individual who had complete access to the back office as well as the dealing room, or can only be attributed to a complete . This would mean that the fundamentals of investment banking which requires that back office be as distinct from front office and mid office was by passed. It is early days yet and only a full investigation will reveal the whole truth.

Till then do we blame the rogue trader or the Frankenstien that created the rogue trader.